A cryptographic accumulator is a scheme where a set of elements is represented by a single short value. This value, along with another value called witness allows to prove membership into the set. In their survey on accumulators [FN02], Fazzio and Nicolisi noted that the Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's construction[CL02] was such that the time to update a witness after m changes to the accumulated value was proportional to m. They posed the question whether batch update was possible, namely if it was possible to build a cryptographic accumulator where the time to update witnesses is independent from the number of changes in the accumulated set.
Introduction
An accumulator is a scheme that hashes elements of a set X into a single, constant size value called the accumulated value. Then it is possible to prove membership into X of an element x using a verification algorithm that takes this accumulated value, an element x, and some value called witness. The first construction of such scheme is due to Benaloh and De Mare [BdM94] . Several improvements later followed, especially in the work of Camenisch and Lysanskaya [CL02] who showed how to build dynamic accumulators (where the accumulated set can evolve), and how to use them as a tool to efficiently implement anonymous credentials. In their survey on accumulators [FN02] , Fazio and Nicolisi pointed out that, in the Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's construction, the time to recompute the witnesses once the accumulated set has been modified was proportional to m, the number of changes of the accumulated value. This raised a natural question: "Is it possible to construct dynamic accumulators in which the update of several witnesses can be performed using a constant size update information?"
Wang et al. [WWP07] answered positively this question by showing a construction that allows batch update. Unfortunately, we show that this construction and its improvement [WWP08] are not secure. Moreover, we prove that there is no way to fix Wang's et al. accumulator by giving a lower bound of Ω(m) in the time that takes to update a witnesses after m updates (delete operations) to the accumulated set.
Related Work. As mentioned above, the first construction for cryptographic accumulators with batch updates was given in [WWP07] and later revised in [WWP08] . Even though no other constructions are known, the existence of accumulators with batch update seems to have been taken for granted, and in fact referenced in subsequent work. Damgärd and Triandopoulos [DT08] cite their availability as an example of a accumulator construction based on the Paillier cryptosystem. Camenisch et al. [CKS09] also mentionned Wang et al.'s construction.
Organization of the paper. First, in Section 2, we briefly recall the notion of a dynamic accumulator, which we follow with our attack. The more general impossibility result is then presented in section 4. We conclude in section 5.
Dynamic Accumulators
In this section we recall general definitions about dynamic accumulators.
Syntax: Accumulator schemes consider two types of participants: a manager who initializes the parameters, computes the accumulated value and the witnesses, and a user, whose role is to verify the membership of elements in the set and possibly ask for elements insertion/deletion. Definition 1. (Adapted from [FN02] ) Let k be the security parameter. An accumulator scheme Acc consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1 k ): a probabilistic algorithm that takes the security parameter k in unary as argument and returns a pair of public and private key (P K, SK) as well as the initial accumulated value for the empty set Acc ∅ .
• Eval(X, Acc ∅ , P K, [SK]): given a finite set of elements X, a public key (or the private key), and the initial accumulated value Acc ∅ , this algorithm returns the accumulated value Acc X corresponding to the set X.
• Verify(x, w, Acc, P K): given an element x, a witness w, an accumulated value Acc and a public key P K, this deterministic algorithm returns OK if the verification is successful, meaning that x ∈ X, or ⊥ otherwise.
• Witness(x, Acc, P K, [SK]): this algorithm returns a witness w associated to the element x of the set represented by Acc.
• Insert(x, Acc X , P K, [SK]): this algorithm computes the new accumulated Acc X∪{x} value obtained after the insertion of x into set X.
• Delete(x, Acc X , P K, [SK]): this algorithm computes the new accumulated value Acc X\{x} obtained from removing the element x from the accumulated set X.
• UpdWit(x, w, Acc X , U pd X,X , P K): this algorithm recomputes the witnesses for some element x that remains in the set. It takes as parameters the element x whose new witness must be updated, the "old" witness w with respect to previous set X represented by the accumulated value Acc X , some update information U pd X,X , the current set X , and the public key P K, and returns a new witness for x. We remark that this algorithm is run by the user.
The above definition is slightly more general than the one by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02] as it does not depend on how these algorithms are implemented, and it explicitly includes the update algorithm UpdWit in the syntax of a scheme. We remark that our impossibility result do not depend on whether the algorithms Verify, Witness, Eval, Insert, Delete, UpdWit are deterministic or probabilistic.
Correctness: The correctness property of an accumulator scheme is rather straightforward: if an element x belongs to the accumulated set X and if the corresponding witness w has been computed using Witness then the verification process should pass.
Definition 2. (Correctness) Let X be a set, Acc X its associated accumulated value and x ∈ X. An accumulator scheme is correct if Verify(x, w, Acc X , P K) = OK where Acc X is the accumulated value of the set X, x ∈ X , P K is the public key and w is the witness obtained by running Witness on Acc X , x and P K.
Security: Consider an experiment where the adversary plays the role of a user and attempts to forge a witness (i.e. finding a valid witness for an element that does not belong to the set) while having access to an oracle that implements the operations done by the manager.
Definition 3. ([CL02]) Let
Acc be an accumulator scheme. We consider the notion of security denoted UF-ACC described by the following experiment: given an integer k, the security parameter, the adversary has access an oracle O that replies to queries by playing the role of the accumulator manager. Using the oracle, the adversary can insert and delete a polynomial number of elements of his choice. The oracle replies with the new accumulated value. The adversary can also ask for witness computations or updates. Finally, the adversary is required to output a pair (x, w). The advantage of the adversary A is defined by:
where P K is the public key generated by Setup.
In the following section we show why Wang et al.'s construction is not secure.
3 An attack on the Accumulator with Batch Update of Wang et. al [WWP07, WWP08] 3.1 Problems with the proof A security proof for the scheme was presented 1 in the original paper by Wang et al. [WWP07] . Unfortunately, there are two main problems in the security proof. First the adversary B used there appears to run the KeyGen algorithm which means it knows the factorization of the modulus n, or at least the knowledge of Φ(n 2 ) and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) where n is a safe modulus of the form n = pq with p, q primes since β = σλmod(n 2 ). In fact, without β computed in such a way, the correctness of the construction cannot hold anymore. (The value σ is also required.) Therefore, it is not clear how the reduction to break the es-RSA assumption can be achieved.
The second problem is that, to break the es-RSA assumption, B needs to find non trivial (y, s) such that y s = x mod n 2 where x is given as input to B. This value x does not seem to be mentioned in the proof.
Description of the attack
As to show that the construction is not secure, i.e., the proof of security cannot be fixed, we present an attack. This attack considers the updated scheme presented in [WWP08] .
The idea is simply to delete an element from the set, and then update the witness of this element with the update information obtained by the execution of the algorithm DelEle. We can then check easily that this new witness is a valid one for the deleted element, which of course should not happen.
So we start with the set X = {c 1 } for some c 1 . We have x 1 = F (c λ 1 mod n 2 ) mod n. Then a random element c * is chosen and x * = F (c λ * mod n 2 ) mod n is computed. The accumulated value is set to v = σ(x 1 + x * ) mod n. The witness value W 1 = (w 1 , t 1 ) for c 1 is defined by w 1 = a c c −t 1 β −1 1 mod n 2 where a c = y * y 1 mod n 2 , y 1 = c λσβ −1 1 mod n 2 , y * = c λσβ −1 * mod n 2 , and t 1 is random.
Then the adversary asks the manager to delete element c 1 . This means that the new accumulated value is v = v − σx 1 + σ(x * * ) mod n = σ(x * + x * * ) mod n where x * * = F (c λ * * mod n 2 ) mod n and c * * is random. The auxiliary value a u used to update the witnesses is a u = y * * y −1 1 mod n 2 where y * * = c λσβ −1 * * mod n 2 . So updating the witness w 1 with a u we obtain w 1 = a u w 1 mod n 2 = y * * y −1
1 mod n 2 = (y * * y * ) β mod n 2 = (c * * c * ) λσ . It follows that
This shows that (w 1 , t 1 ) is a valid witness for the deleted element x 1 . Therefore the scheme is not secure. Indeed the problem is simply that the information a u allows to update every old witnesses including w 1 for which such an update should not be possible.
A lower bound for updating the witnesses
The attack of the last section is an indication that the proposed construction may have some design flaws. In this section, we show that the problem indeed is more fundamental and the batch update is essentially unrealizable. We argue this by presenting a lower bound on the size of U pd X,X , the information needed to update the witnesses after m changes (more precisely deletions). Any update algorithm UpdWit must at least read U pd X,X , and so it also bounds the running time of any such algorithm. Theorem 1. For an update involving m delete operations in a set of n elements, the size of the information U pd X,X required by the algorithm UpdWit while keeping the dynamic accumulator secure is Ω(m log n m ). In particular if m = n 2 with n even, we have |U pd X,X | = Ω(m).
Proof. We consider the following scenario. The set accumulated in some point of the time is X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, and the corresponding accumulated value is Acc X . We suppose the user possesses all the witnesses for each element in X and knows the accumulated value. Then m Delete operations are performed, that is the new set obtained is X = X − X d where X d = {x i 1 , x i 2 , ..., x im }. The manager computes the new accumulated value Acc X and sends it to the user along with the update information U pd X,X required to update all the witnesses.
With this information U pd X,X , the user is able to reconstruct the set X d of deleted elements by checking for each element of x, if its corresponding witness can be successfully updated using U pd X,X and the algorithm UpdWitness. That is if the result of w = UpdWitness(x, w, Acc X , U pd X,X , P K) is not a valid witness i.e. Verify(x, w , X) = ⊥, then the element has been deleted. Note that this condition is necessary as in the contrary the scheme would be incorrect (some existing elements in X could not have their witness updated) or insecure (it could be possible to compute witnesses for deleted elements).
Hence, as the user is able to recompute the set of deleted elements X d only using the value U pd X,X , U pd X,X must contain at least the information required to code a subset with m elements of a set with n elements. There are 
Conclusion
This result shows that the batch update property as proposed in [FN02] cannot be obtained, as the time to update all the witnesses cannot be linear in the security parameter k, i.e O(k), but it must be at least O(m) = O(n) = O(p(k)) = ω(k) for some polynomial p. Notice that our lower bound is not tight since Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's accumulator requires O(p(k) · k) time to update the witnesses after O(p(k)) changes. Nonetheless, in principle, it leaves some (potential) room to improve their construction by at most a factor of k.
Finally, one may consider getting around this impossibility result by not allowing deletions in the set. Unfortunately, such an accumulator can be trivially implemented by signing the elements of the set, as in this case there is no replay-attack. The witness for every element consists in its signature under the manager's private key, and clearly need not to be updated.
